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This laboratory study evaluated the usefulness of a new market available scavenging 
system (patient mask and filter) in controlling the spread of airborne pathogens by: 1. 
Develop a laboratory simulation of an infectious patient exhaling a range of respirable 
bacteria and viruses into a laboratory hood. 2. Compare and contrast capabilities of the 
market-available scavenging system to reduce and control pathogens in a laboratory 










life-like manikin head equipped with a bioaerosol collision nebulizer was set up to 
simulate a person exhausting pathogenic 
    
	  	
 is was tested by 
using two different scenarios: 1. The scavenging system was used the entire duration of 
the trial (Case) 2. The scavenging system was not used at all during the trial (Control). 
The nebulizer used multiple types of respirable pathogens (bacteria and viruses) to 




range of pathogens likely to be found in infectious patients. Pathogens that may escape 
the scavenging system were captured using liquid impingers, and pathogens inside the 
scavenging system were captured by the filter that came with the market available mask. 
A filter flask was used to capture pathogens that broke through the    	 
 
supplied filter. The captured pathogens were analyzed and quantified by spread plate 
analyses for both bacteria and viruses. The filter equipped with the market available 




filter (p   .05). The HEPA filters in the scavenging mask followed a general trend 
showing a higher percentage of the smaller viruses passed through the HEPA filter 
compared to the larger viruses. However, overall the market available scavenging system 
proved to reduce the exposure to pathogens by 93.2% when exposed to the smallest 
viruses  	
 	  
         
 Based 
on this laboratory research, it appears the market available scavenging system may help 
protect healthcare workers working in the PACU and ICU against airborne pathogen 




CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Thesis Statement 
The overarching goal of this research is to reduce, prevent and control pathogen 
exposure among healthcare workers in the post anesthesia care unit and intensive care 
unit by controlling the exposure at the source (the patient). To help achieve this goal a 
laboratory study was conducted to simulate pathogen exposures to healthcare workers 
including those that work in the PACU and ICU. The objective was to simulate an 
infectious patient wearing a market available waste anesthetic gas scavenging system 
versus a patient not wearing a scavenging system. We hypothesize that the scavenging 
system may be as useful in pathogen control as it has proved to be useful in the reduction 
of waste anesthetic gas exposure. 
 To test this hypothesis, a patient off-gassing airborne pathogens was simulated 
using a manikin equipped with an atomizer nebulizing a bioaerosol while the scavenging 
system mask and filter is being used and the mask and filter not being used. Each 
simulation was analyzed comparing the amount of pathogens (bioaerosols) captured 
while using the scavenging mask and when it is not being used. The amount of 
bioaerosols captured on the filter was compared to how much was captured passed the 
filter to understand the amount of breakthrough that occurs.  
1.2 What are Bioaerosols? 
The human conception of danger is what the mind perceives as harmful to the body. It is 
well known that human beings are more careless if they cannot perceive their 




inevitable and for the most part are never thought of by most people. Aerosols can be 
defined as microscopic particles composed of liquids and/or solids that are suspended 
in a gas. The most essential focus in aerosols is understanding its physical, chemical, 
  	  

         n micrometers (µm) 
or nanometers (nm)), shape and density are parameters that express its abilities to 
move in the atmosphere, along with the duration it can travel and its capability to 
penetrate across barriers. The chemical and biological properties of aerosols are also 
very important in the sense that they tell us potentially of their origins, the quality of 
the air we breathe, and the health effects to humans. These properties are used to 
comprehend how a particular aerosol acts while suspended in the air, reacts to the 
human body, and interacts with other aerosols and aspects of the environment. (Hinds, 
1999) 
 An important category of aerosols which has been a concern in public health 
for years and has begun to get attention in occupational health is bioaerosols. As the 
name implies, bioaerosols are aerosols of biological origins. These can include 
viruses, viable organisms, endospores, and products of organisms. Bioaerosols have a 
              	      
generalizations about them, collectively, near impossible to draw accurate 
conclusions. Exposure to bioaerosols come with potential health effects such as 
infectious disease and allergic reactions. (Hinds, 1999). Potentially being pathogenic, 
viruses and viable organisms (mainly bacteria) are being exhibited as a health hazard 
that needs to be controlled. In order to understand how to control them, the 
understanding of how they become aerosolized and transmitted is essential. 
Aerosols can be defined as microscopic particles composed of liquids and/or 
solids that are suspended in a gas. The most essential focus in aerosols is 
   
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(usually measured in micrometers (µm) or nanometers (nm)), shape and density are 
parameters that express. 
  Aerosols can be defined as microscopic particles composed of liquids and/or 
solids that are suspended in a gas. The most essential focus in aerosols is 
understanding its physical, chemical, and biol	  
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(usually measured in micrometers (µm) or nanometers (nm)), shape and density are 
parameters that express its abilities to move in the atmosphere, along with the 
duration it can travel and its capability to penetrate across barriers. The chemical and 
biological properties of aerosols are also very important in the sense that they tell us 
potentially of their origins, the quality of the air we breathe, and the health effects to 
humans. These properties are used to comprehend how a particular aerosol acts while 
suspended in the air, reacts to the human body, and interacts with other aerosols and 
aspects of the environment. (Hinds, 1999) 
 An important category of aerosols which has been a concern in public health 
for years and has begun to get attention in occupational health is bioaerosols. As the 
name implies, bioaerosols are aerosols of biological origins. These can include 
viruses, viable organisms, endospores, and products of organisms. Bioaerosols have a 
large range of     	   
  
   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generalizations about them, collectively, near impossible to draw accurate 
conclusions. Exposure to bioaerosols come with potential health effects such as 
infectious disease and allergic reactions. (Hinds, 1999). Potentially being pathogenic, 
viruses and viable organisms (mainly bacteria) are being exhibited as a health hazard 
that needs to be controlled. In order to understand how to control them, the 
understanding of how they become aerosolized and transmitted is essential. 
1.3 Historical Epidemics 
The spread of pathogenic bioaerosols have historically shown to be lethal. One 
pathogen that has been an issue for centuries is Tuberculosis (TB). TB is known to 
spread in areas of condensed populations living in unsanitary conditions. In the late 
1800s and early 1900s, people were leaving the farms and hillsides to come work in 
factories inside the city limits creating an era called the industrial revolution. This city 
living was a great reservoir for TB causing what is known as The Great White Plague. 
(Sucre, 1995). It was estimated that 70% - 90% of urban areas in Europe and North 
America were infected with TB, and 80% of this population died either directly or 
indirectly by this disease. (Library, 2013). Just in America, it was estimated that 




TB was also responsible for 40% of all middle class deaths at this time. In order to 
control the spread of this disease, the sanatoria movement occurred, which called for 
sick people to be quarantined and removed from the healthy population. (Library, 
2013) This proved to be very helpful and the mortality rate for TB steadily decreased 
to a controllable level. 
    	
	    	    
	  	
becomes so powerful or resistant to vaccines that it causes a world-wide emergency. 
The Spanish Flu of 1918-1919 is one of the worst cases of influenza in recorded 
history. Severe illness escalated very quickly after contracting the disease. It was 
documented that people would feel fine when they woke up and would have died by 
the end of the day. People who did not die fro 		  	 	 safe, as 
a significant portion of the population would later die from complications. 
    
   	      !	
Flu, and about 50 million people died with 675,000 of them living in the United 
States. The lack of scientific knowledge and resources allowed the Spanish Flu to be 
placed in history as one of the worst influenza season in history (Pandemic Flu 
History, 2012). 
 Most historical epidemics occurred long ago, which would make the average 
person feel comfortable that it could not happen in this day and age. In 2003, a new 
pathogen emerged that no one had ever seen before, Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome (SARs). SARs is part of the coronavirus and has been described as a 
severe form of pneumonia. This pathogen is believed to have its origins in Asia. It 
became an international issue when a doctor from the Guandong Province, that had 
been treating patients with SARs, stayed at the Metropole Hotel in Hong Kong. 
Staying on the same floor of this hotel was a tourist couple from Canada. The couple 
transmitted the disease over from Hong Kong introducing it to North America. 
(Sciences, 2014,) The World Health Organization states that there were a total of 
8,098 people infected with SARs in this outbreak which 774 people died. The 
majority of the people who died were healthcare workers, patients, and visitors. 




government and public health officials to take note of illness happening in other 
countries, knowing the possibility that one person can spread a disease globally. 
 The Ebola outbreak of 2014 has been one of the largest in recorded history 
and is considered the first in West Africa. Ebola is predominant in small villages in 
Africa and usually confined to these areas because the lack of traveling. Ebola is 
mostly transmitted by human to human interaction through bodily secretions such as 
blood or saliva. As of August 19, 2014 there were 2612 suspected and laboratory 
confirmed deaths. Major international health organizations such as the WHO, the 
Center for Disease Control (CDC) and other international organizations are helping 
treat these ill patients and reduce this outbreak from spreading. The Ebola outbreak in 
West Africa has the potential of becoming a worldwide pandemic if the proper 
techniques are not taken by these organizations to eliminate the chance of spreading 
the disease to their home country. (CDC, 2014)  
1.4 Healthcare Workers (HCWs) and Their Environment 
The Bureau of Labor Statistic recently shown that there are about 2.7 million 
nurses working in the United States with an increase need of an additional 1.2 million 
jobs by the year 2020. (Statistics, 2012) Along with this increase in jobs, studies have 
shown that 55% of nurses surveyed plan to retire between the years of 2011 and 2020. 
(Hader, 2006) This large growth and retirement may insure a shortage of nurses in the 
near future, potentially forcing nurses to care for more patients and work for longer 
hours. Some hospitals have combatted these shortages by recruiting foreign nurses. 
Even though these nurses are trained as well as any other nurse, there are still barriers 
that may cause difficulty in fitting into the hospital setting. Some of difficulties that 
can come with recruiting foreign nurses are: language barriers, unfamiliar with the 
healthcare system in federal, local, and organizational level, and personal/societal 
value gaps (Wong, 2012). 
 With the added workload on these nurses, it is well understood why nursing is 
considered a very stressful occupation. As of 2005, it was estimated that the 
Registered Nurse (RN) turnover rate was 13.9% and a vacancy rate of 16.1%. With 




per new hire. (Group, 2005) (Hunt, 2009) As one would expect, the majority of these 
nurses that quit are newer to the field. It is estimated that about 13% of newly RNs 
had changed their principal jobs after one year and 37% were ready to quit. The 
demanding jobs that nurses have can be very stressful and may affect their 
performance. These high stress work conditions can cause nurses to forget training, 
not take the proper measurements to protect themselves, or make other mental errors 
that would not normally occur under less severe conditions. With newly licensed RNs 
starting repeatedly, many may not have the proper training or experience to take all 
necessary precautions and can increase the chances for medical/performance errors. 
Two departments that are both physically and mentally stressful are the Intensive 
Care Units (ICU) and the Post Anesthesia Care Units (PACU). 
There are over a half million intensive care nurses practicing in the United 
States today. (About Critical Care Nursing, 2013). These nurses work in close 
proximity to critically ill patients that have a wide variety of issues such as: shock, 
acute/chronic respiratory failure, infections, renal failure, neurological condition, and 
bleeding/clotting. (Health) With these different types of health conditions the nurses 
have to use different treatments that can cause harmful exposures. Depending on the 
individual patient, intensive care nurses may be exposed to many different exposures 
like: radiation from x-rays and radioisotope sources, waste anesthetic gases (WAG), 
long term exposure to medications, airborne pathogens, and blood/bodily fluids. 
(IIOSH, 2000) The diversity of patient issues demand that intensive care nurses must 
be well trained and very focused on the patient, the environment, and their personal 
safety. 
Another group of nurses that may be smaller in population but have just as 
stressful of a job are perianesthesia nurses. In the United States, there are over 55,000 
perianesthsia nurses employed. (ASPAN, 2013) These nurses mainly work in close 
proximity to patients before and after surgery and are potentially exposed to WAG 
and biological pathogens, where the patient is the reservoir. In the PACU, patients 
coughing is very common because of mechanical and pharmacological irritation 
caused from the anesthetic gases and surgery. Not only can the coughing expel 




membrane from tubes inserted during surgery. Coughing is also common in certain 
surgeries like ear, nose, and throat (ENT) and dental surgery. (Csete, 1996) Coughing 
up blood and saliva generates bio-aerosols within the area of the perianesthesia nurse 
causing potential transmission of pathogens. When nurses work in close proximity to 
sick/healing patients, they are being exposed to treatments given to the patients such 
as WAG, and they are potentially exposed to pathogens brought in by the patient.  
1.5 Human Transmission 
The majority of bioaerosols transmitted by means other than direct contact 
often exits a sick person through their respiratory system. Activities like coughing, 
sneezing, talking and even breathing can cause formations of respiratory droplets. 
There are three different types of bioaerosol-respiratory transmission: droplet, droplet 
nuclei, and airborne transmission. Droplet transmission can be defined as respiratory 
droplets that carry pathogens and traveling directly from the respiratory tract of an ill 
person to the mucosal surfaces of a susceptible host; physically, they are greater than 
     	
 	  	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are a lot smaller in size going from less than or equal to 5 µm in size and can travel 
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transmissions. Contrary to droplet and droplet nuclei, these do not have to be caused 
by sneezing or coughing. Airborne particles can travel by dust or any other particulate 
in the air. (Siegel, Rhinehart, Jackson, & Chiarello, 2007) All three of these 
transmissions are important, but this research focuses on droplet and droplet nuclei 
transmission spread by breathing, coughing, sneezing and talking.  
 Out of all of the mechanisms for the dispersal of droplets, normal breathing 
can possibly be the most critical. Coughing and sneezing may produce more 
aerosolization at once, but breathing occurs more than the other mechanisms. (Tang, 
et al., 2013 ) Human breathing has a tidal volume of about 0.5 liters per breath taken. 
Since the average person (77kg) takes 20 breathes per minute, we can calculate the 
average flow rate to be about 10 liters per minute. (Green, et al., 2012) At this flow 
rate, an average of about 38 particles of droplet and droplet nuclei are expelled from 




travel an average of 2 or 2.6 feet depending whether it exits through the nose or 
mouth, respectively. (Tang, et al., 2013 ) 
 Coughing is a reaction that occurs when there is irritation in the throat. The 
dimensions of a cough, along with other methods of aerosolization, depends on 
gender, height, and age. The exhaled volume varies from 400   1600 ml for males 
and 250   1250 ml for females. These are also fast with a peak velocity time between 
57 and 110 ms. (Tang, et al., 2013 ) This violent displacement of air disperses about 
710 particles per cough that can expose people up to 3 feet. (Fernstrom & Goldblatt, 
2013) (Guptaa, Linb, & Chena, 2009) Coughs not only expel droplet/droplet nuclei 
into the environment, but also bits of the mucosal lining of the throat that can also 
harbor pathogens. 
 A sneeze is a sudden, forceful, uncontrolled expulsion of air from the lungs 
that travels through the nose and mouth cause by irritation of the mucosal membrane 
of the nose and throat. (Sneezing, 2012) Even though this definition seems similar to 
a cough, sneezing is more forceful and is produced by a lot more energy. The average 
sneeze exits the mouth traveling at about 4.5 meters per second. (Tang, et al., 2013 ) 
Different from a cough, sneezes are estimated to release on average 40,000 particles 
per sneeze covering a range of over 2 feet (Fernstrom & Goldblatt, 2013; Tang, et al., 
2013 ). 
 The final mechanism for droplet transmission is the most essential part of 
communication and obtaining of knowledge. Talking stands second to breathing as 
far as actions that are done on a frequent basis. Studies have shown that talking has an 
exhaled volume of about 25 liters (for reciting a 2 minute passage) and a peak flow 
rate of 1.6 liter per second. This exhaled breath causes the release of about 36 
particulates per 100 words with an exposure range of over 2 feet. (Fernstrom & 
Goldblatt, 2013) (Gupta, Lin, & Chen, 2010) 
1.6 Healthcare Exposure Controls 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) defines industrial 
 	
 science and art devoted to the anticipation, recognition, evaluation, and 




which may cause sickness, impaired health and well-being, or significant discomfort 
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actions builds on the next, the anticipation, recognition, and evaluation are used to 
develop controls. Controls that are used to harness hazardous exposures should be 
done by the following hierarchy: elimination/substitution, engineering, administration, 
and personal protective equipment (PPE). 
Elimination and substitution is the top of the hierarchy because it completely 
removes the hazard from the area instead of controlling it. Disposable products such 
as needles, are a form of elimination because once it is contaminated, they are 
removed and never to be used again. Disposable products have played a major role in 
reducing the spread of infectious pathogen in healthcare settings. 
Engineering controls are very important because they control the hazard at the 
source by designing out any hazardous condition in the system that can affect the user. 
In infection control, the idea is to engineer hospital rooms to contain any pathogens 
that may be in the room, or keep out any pathogens from entering the room. HEPA 
(High Efficiency Particulate Air) filters are used to competently clean the air coming 
into the rooms by capturing most particles (pathogens included), providing quality air. 
For rooms that house infectious patients, these rooms need to be under negative 
pressure with about 12 air changes per hour of non-recirculated air. The windows, 
floors and ceiling should also be sealed to keep air from leaking out (Siegel, 
Rhinehart, Jackson, & Chiarello, 2007). 
Administrative controls are used to control hazardous exposures by way of 
policies and standard operating procedures. Common administrative controls are: 
surveillance, education, patient placement, and hand hygiene. Surveillance in 
healthcare gathers and analyze data with an overall goal of reducing mortality and 
morbidity for the faculty, patients, and visitors. Data collected through surveillance 
can predict the spread of infections by monitoring high-risk populations, device use, 
and facility location. Educating healthcare personnel by giving them the scientific 
rationale for policies is essential for them to fully understand why policies are set. By 
truly understanding the scientific rationale, the healthcare personnel will be able to 




administrative control is patient isolation. If a patient has a known infection, they 
must get top priority in having their own room. By isolating infected patients from the 
noninfected, this can reduce the spread of disease while containing the infection into a 
single area. The final and arguably the most important administrative control is hand 
hygiene. Traditionally hand washing has been done with antiseptic soap and water; 
however, alcohol based hand sanitizers are being used more often. They have become 
a popular cho   	 




microbicidal capabilities and convenience. These administrative controls along with 
the other controls above allow for cleaner and safer healthcare facilities (Siegel, 
Rhinehart, Jackson, & Chiarello, 2007). 
All of the control methods so far has attempted to keep everyone in the 
healthcare facility safe. Personal protection equipment (PPE) is solely used to keep 
the user safe. The reason it is the lowest is because it 	  
 

contain the hazard, it just makes the user capable to work in the hazardous conditions. 
Common forms of PPE used in healthcare settings are gloves, gowns/aprons, 
facesheilds/goggles and respirators. As one would guess, the types and amount of 
PPE used depends on the environment and expected potential exposures that 
correspond to the task. There are some guidelines that are recommended by the 
Center for Disease Control and Prevention. Gloves should no longer be latex due to 
allergic reactions. Gowns and aprons should be made of a fluid resistant material so 
to not have bodily fluids soak through the material. Respirators should be rated as a 
N95, N99, or N100 to ensure sufficient filtering of air the user is breathing. For all 
PPE, the most important thing is to ensure it fits properly. If it does not fit, then the 
PPE is not fully protecting the worker. 
The hierarchy of controls model has been used and proven worthy time and 
time again. Even though it is a very important tool, it is not perfect because the people 
who use it are not perfect. The more human interaction the controls have, the more 
chances for error to occur. The administrative controls mentioned are very helpful in 
infection control but the chaotic environment of healthcare may cause healthcare 
workers to forget their training, education, overlook policies, or rush through 




the PPE on correctly and take all precautions that are required. Also since the 
hazardous exposure is not actually removed or contained, if the PPE failed due to a 
tear or malfunction, then the person is being exposed to the hazardous agent. With 
some PPE, such as respirators, the slightest thing such as an unshaven face can cause 
failure. As long as human beings are controlling their fate, there will always be 
human error. The priority is to use the top tiers of the hierarchy (elimination and 
engineering) as much as possible without abandoning the lower tiers for extra safety 
(Siegel, Rhinehart, Jackson, & Chiarello, 2007). 
1.7 Epidemiologic Studies 
As mentioned earlier, the SARs outbreak that occurred in 2003 was one of the 
most devastating outbreaks in recent history. This retrospective study described one 
of the most impacted hospitals in Toronto where 144 persons contracted SARS. One 
of the most devastating circumstances that left the Toronto area vulnerable (not just 
this hospital) was that the SARS was spreading to other patients and healthcare 
personnel before awareness of the presence of this disease by the Canadian medical 
community; therefore, they did not have proper respiratory precautions implemented. 
Out of the 144 people who came ill, 111 (77%) contracted the disease in a hospital. 
The majority of these people contracted it in the same hospital that the son of the 
index case checked in after he fell ill.  Out of all of the ill, 23% of the patients had to 
stay in the hospital for extended stays due to complications and suppressed immune 
systems. Less than 10% of the patients had to return to the hospital due to reoccurring 
symptoms. Unfortunately 8 people died (6.5% mortality rate). The major modes of 
transmission were believed to be during interaction between patients and healthcare 
personnel and also during the transportation of sick patients. (Booth, et al., 2003) 
In 2008, an outbreak of measles occurred in a hospital in Tucson, AZ. A Swiss 
traveler was traveling back from Mexico when he entered the Tucson hospital after 
feeling ill. The healthcare personnel came to the conclusion that he had the measles 
and other patients and healthcare personnel became ill. Because of this exposure to 
measles, there were 363 suspected cases of measles that had to be screened, 8 




it was concluded that the second person to contract measles was sitting beside the 
Swiss traveler in the emergency waiting room. The third was found to be the HCW 
that assisted the second patient. From there the disease spread through the hospital. 
The overall cost of this outbreak was almost $800,000 dollar in which 56% was 
accredited to the lost of time from the HCWs (15,120 hours of sick leave) (Chen, et 
al., 2011). 
In 2005, a study showed a nosocomial transmission of Group A Streptococcus 
(GAS) from a patient to HCWs. The index case was a homeless Native American 
woman who entered into the hospital with respiratory issues, weakness, arthrulgas, 
and vomiting. She was also coughing up greenish sputum with a sore throat. Even 
after more than 48 hours of antimicrobial therapy, her respiratory therapist still 
contracted a genetically identical strain of GAS. Because of this woman, 705 
healthcare workers had to be screened. Only 14 HCW were tested positive, but 10 of 
the 14 showed no symptoms even though they had the disease. Seven of the 
respiratory therapist family members also tested positive for GAS (Lacy & Horn, 
2009). 
Adenovirus is a febrile respiratory illness that has been a noteworthy problem 
with military trainees. In March 2007, military officials reported a 3 fold increase in 
febrile respiratory illness which were later identified as the Ad14 adenovirus among 
military trainees. Fifteen military trainees were admitted into the hospital, three of 
which had to be put in intensive care with one death. An investigation was done from 
August 1, 2007 to June 14, 2007to assess the impact of exposure on the HCWs in this 
hospital. Outcomes happened as followed: Out of 483 HCWs that were identified, 
218 agreed to participate in the study. Forty-two tested positive for Ad 14 with 28 
being confirmed. Eighty nine percent of the confirmed cases were symptomatic by 
definition with 16 of these patients additionally reporting fever. Of the 16 cases, 
fourteen continued working while they were sick. Nine of these cases were nurses, 
three were medical technicians, one was a respiratory therapist and one was a medical 




1.8 Review Summary of the Literature 
As mentioned earlier, nurses and other healthcare personnel have very 
stressful occupations. The more stressed a worker is, the more likely he/she is to 
make mental errors. These mental errors can affect the patients, workers, families or a 
combination of all. Not only can stress cause mental errors that can lead to hazardous 
conditions, but it also decreases the workers immune system. With a weakened 
immune system, healthcare workers are more apt to be absent due to illness or 
continue working while sick which is a rich source of spreading infections. These 
mistakes made by the healthcare personnel can be costly and become a vicious circle. 
Figure 1.1 indicates a possible route of how infections spread. Generally an infectious 
person transmit their illness to surrounding areas and it survives to pass to the next 
victim. Most methods used currently try to control the exposure after the infection has 
spread through good hygiene and sterile techniques, but very few actually try to 
control it at the source of exposure, which is the patient. To reduce infections from 
spreading, healthcare facilities implement controls at the source of exposure to protect 
the workers from illness along with the patients, family, and other visitors. A new 
market available scavenging system has been developed a scavenging system to 
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control pathogens exposure as well as it controls waste anesthetic gas, this can be a 
very powerful tool in reducing the spread of infectious disease in hospital settings, 









CHAPTER 2. MATERIALS AND METHODS 
2.1 Procedure 
This study was divided into two separate parts: bacterial trials and virus trials. 
The trials were separated in order to ensure that the results are accurate and issues 
with unwanted interactions between the viruses and bacteria will not occur during 
analysis. The first part of this project had 3 steps to each trial: standard curve, control, 
and case trials. The standard curve was important in understanding the boundaries of 
the sampling equipment by observing its efficiency in capturing the bioaerosols in the 
air with known concentrations being nebulized. The controls were used to understand 
at what concentration of bioaerosols the sampling methods can expect to capture if 
there are  engineering control or barriers used. Finally, the case trials are the last to 
be completed which include the scavenging mask used as it would be in the PACU 
and ICU. Figure 2.1 outlines the steps of the study. 
 The live bacteria and viruses were used to give a practical understanding of  
the issues involved when microorganisms are being released into the air. The primary 
characteristic was the range of sizes that could correlate with common infections such 
as the Methicillin Resistant Staphycoccus aureus (MRSA) and the common cold . 
The sizes in between the maximum (bacteria) and minimum (viruses) help identify 





Figure 2.1 Layout of the Primary Procedures of the Study 
2.2 Microorganisms Used 
For the validity of this study, viable microorganisms were used as our aerosol 
as oppose to using an artificial representation. In choosing the microorganisms to use 
in this study, size was an essential characteristic. The goal of choosing 
microorganisms were to represent a large pathogenic bacteria such as mycobacterium 
tuberculosis (2   4 µm) and through the smallest of pathogenic viruses like the ones 
that can cause the common cold (~ 30 nm). (Bryan, 2011) (Kowalski., 2008). 
Microorganisms that are within this range were also used. By having a broad range of 
microorganism sizes, our study can potentially identify any changes that may occur 
due to size differentials. In choosing our bacteria, we wanted to choose one bacteria 
that was gram positive and one was stained gram negative in the event that the 
morphological differences may be a factor in the behavior of the bacteria. It was also 
important from an analytic standpoint that both bacteria would be able to grow on 
selective media in attempt to quantify each microorganism separately. In choosing the 
 	
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use the same host cell cannot, under normal circumstances, be quantified individually. 
The chosen microorganisms used for this study were: Pseudomonas aeruginosa and 
Staphylococcus aureus (surrogate bacteria) and  -121,  -S1, PR-772, and MS2 
(surrogate viruses). Additional information about these microorganisms can be found 
in Appendix A. 
2.2.1 Preparation 
The P. aeruginosa and S. aureus was obtain from Food Microbiology 
Laboratory at Purdue University (Bruce Applegate, 2014). The S. aureus strain used 
was a safer strain that is not resistant to antibiotics and was vulnerable to sterilization. 
The P. aeruginosa strain used in this study has the lux genes that allowed it to 
luminesce at a wavelength of 490 nm to ensure a visible difference between the two 
bacteria. (Lin & Meighe, 2009) These bacteria were grown in 100 ml flask of Luria 
Broth (LB) overnight. This overnight culture was mixed with glycerol in a 1:2 ratio, 
placed in 1.5 ml eppendorf tubes, and stored in a -  reezer. When a fresh culture 
was needed, a sample from the tube was removed and placed in a fresh flask of LB 
broth and grown overnight. The optical density (OD) was measured using a 
biophotometer to get an accurate concentration of cells for each set of runs. An OD of 
1.7 for P. aeruginosa indicated around 4.4x108 CFUS/ml (Colony Forming Units per 
milliliter) and an OD of 1.5 about 7.9 x 107 CFUS/ml for S. aureus. In most cases, the 
cultures in the flasks were too concentrated in which case 0.05M phosphate buffer 
was added to dilute to proper concentration. Twenty milliliters of each culture were 
used in the nebulizer to make a total volume of 40 ml. 
 The surrogate viruses ( -121,  -S1, PR-772, and MS2) were also obtained 
from stocks in Food Microbiology Laboratory. Each of these surrogate viruses are 
different in sizes and also use an array of cell hosts. All surrogate viruses use different 
strains of Escherichia coli except for  -S1 which uses Psuedomonas fluorecens M3A 
as its host. These surrogate viruses were grown using standard protocol for growing 
bacteriophage as described in Appendix C. The grown surrogate viruses were 




Appendix B. These surrogate viruses were filter sterilized using 0.2 µm filtered 
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  surrogate viruses 
was known from the stocks, calculating how much was needed for 50 ml by using the 
dilution formula C1V1 = C2V2 was possible. For each surrogate viruses, three values 
were known: C1 from the stock surrogate viruses, C2 was desired concentration (107), 
and final volume of 50 ml. This provided the equation: (Stock Conc.) x (?) = (107) x 
(50ml). The determined amount was mixed together in a 50ml conical tube and 
surrogate viruses buffer was added to get a final volume of 50 ml which was used in 
the nebulizer for testing. The step by step equation methods for each surrogate viruses 
are shown in Appendix D. 
2.3 Scavenging System Used 
The original purpose of the scavenging system is to reduce the amount of WAG 
that perianesthesia nurses are exposed to during the work shift. The system uses a 
combination of both negative pressure (suction/scavenging) and positive pressure 
(oxygen delivery) to keep a constant flow of oxygen to the patient as needed and 
removal of the waste anesthetic gases which reduces the perianesthesia nurses
exposure. The scavenging system is designed like a normal oxygen tent, but has 
added an opening around the oral cavity region that is connected to a flexible, 
extendible suction tube. The oxygen being delivered to the mask comes at a flow rate 
of 10 liters per minute (lpm) and the suction has a flow rate of about 45 lpm. The 
scavenging system is designed so that it is not required to fit tightly on the patient in 
order to keep them calm and comfortable. At the end of the suction tube is a filter 
whose purpose is to capture debris from the mouth such as blood or sputum. (ISO-
Gard, 2014) The aspects of engineering controls that remove the hazardous exposure 






The nebulizer used for this study was the 6-jet CN-25 MRE (Microbiological 
Research Establishment) Collision Nebulizer from BGI USA instruments. It was 
chosen because of its impressive performance in similar studies and its specificity to 
aerobiological research. (Green, et al., 2012) (BGI Instruments, 2006). The collision 
nebulizer is made of 316 stainless steel and glass which allows it to be autoclaved. 
The amount of air pressure applied to the nebulizer determines the amount of liquid 
that is released. The equation Qliq = -0.84859 + 0.2336 * ln (psig)
2 allow users to 
determine how much liquid is being dispersed  in the air in units of ml/hr. (BGI 
Instruments, 2006) For the purpose of this project, 27-28 psi of air was applied to the 
nebulizer which produces 0.52ml of liquid for every 15 minute run. 
2.5 Laboratory Setup 
T    	  
	  is to simulate an infectious patient 
breathing to the best of the ability of the resources available. A life size manikin head 
was donated to the project by the Purdue School of Nursing. A piece of 5/8 inch inner-
diameter corrugated tubing was fed through the end of the neck and pulled through 
the mouth stopping just inside the opening of the mouth. This gave the bioaerosols 
being nebulized direction and kept it contained in the mouth until it was released out 
of the opening. The nebulizer was connected to the neck end of the manikin where it 
was inserted in the corrugated tubing. After some minor testing, it was apparent that 
minimal aerosol coming out of the nebulizer would leak through the tube on the end 
of the nebulizer so this end was not sealed. The aerosol coming out of the nebulizer 
was to represent a human breath leaving the body. The average person has a tidal 
volume of 5 to 7 ml/kg (MacIntyre , 2005). A large 100 kg (220 lbs) man in average 
condition should have an exhaled flowrate of about 12 lpm. This is calculated under 
the assumption of a tidal volume of 6ml/kg and 20 breathes per minute. (Green, et al., 
2012) The nebulizer in this study had an air supply of 27  28 psi measured using a 
thermo-anemometer to give an exhaled volume of about 12 lpm. Even though 




out of the body; therefore, it is acceptable to have the nebulizer aerosolize at a 
constant rate. The sampling methods used for this study were two liquid impingers 
from SKC Inc. that were connected to separate Gilian high flow personal air samplers  
running at a flowrate of 3 lpm.  The impingers were filled with buffer (0.05M 
phosphate buffer for the bacteria and phage buffer for the surrogate viruses. The 
volumes were different for the bacteria compared to the surrogate virus trials. The 
bacteria trials had 15 ml of phosphate buffer while the surrogate virus trials used 10 
ml of surrogate viruses buffer. This is because the samplers were pulling the phage 
buffer into the sampler and 10 ml gave a volume that would not let this occur. The 
bioaerosols entered in the impingers through a piece of tygon tubing with the inlet 
equipped with an empty 25mm styrene cassette. Every run was done for 15 minutes. 
At the end of the 15 minutes, the nebulizer air supply was stopped, followed by the 
air sampler, and then any other devices that were being used. 
2.5.1 Standard Curve 
The standard curve was used to identify the limit of detection of our liquid 
impingers and determine its capture efficiency of bioaerosols. The goal of this part is 
to set up the ideal conditions to capture as much bioaerosols as possible. With this, 
our air sampler cassettes were placed directly above the mouth of the manikin and 
rested on its lips. Ideally anything that exited the mouth had the opportunity to be 
captured by the impingers. The undiluted mixture of microorganisms that were placed 
in the nebulizer were the same concentration that was going to be nebulized in the 
other trials. From this stock solution, serial dilutions were made to make 9 different 
solutions that ranged in concentration from 0 (stock) to 10-8. The standard curve 
started with the 10-8 dilution with three runs of each dilution and continue to higher 
concentrations. The reason the mixture was nebulized from lower to higher is to 
reduce the cleaning and preparation times since whatever is in the nebulizer and other 
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Figure 2.2 Standard Curve Setup with Components Labeled 
2.5.2 Control (No Scavenging System Used) 
The control and the case were essentially set up the same way only with the 
scavenging system present in the case trials. In the control runs, the sampling 
cassettes were position     	
    	 mouth to simulate a 
healthcare worker in close proximity to the patient which would be a vulnerable 
position for the healthcare worker. ( McGlothlin, Moenning,, & Cole, 2013)  All 
samples used the same stock concentration in the nebulizer. There were 12 runs at 
which the impingers were cleaned and sterilized before the each use. The idea of the 
control is to see how much exposure to bioaerosols will be captured (represent the 






Figure 2.3 Control Setup with Sampler Inlet 6 Inches Above the Manikin 
2.5.3 Case (Scavenging System Used) 
Everything used in the control runs were used in the case runs and in the same 
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The suction tubing of the mask was directed to a filter flask which contained 50 ml of 
buffer. The scavenging masked was connected to the filter flask by a piece of tubing 
that went inside the filter flask to make contact with the buffer. The filter flask was 
connected to a ¼ horsepower General Electric vacuum that pulled in air at 45 lpm 
which was also measured by the thermo anemometer. Once a sample was completed, 
all liquid from both impingers were placed in a conical tube, the filter from the 
scavenging mask was extracted using a Dremel® tool and placed in a conical tube 
with 20ml of buffer where it was then vortexed for 5 minutes to extract the 
microorganisms from the filter. The liquid in the filter flask was rolled around to 





Figure 2.4 Case Setup with the Scavenging Mask 
 
Figure 2.5 Case Setup with the Nebulizer, Filter, and Filter Flask Labeled 
2.5.4 HEPA Filter and Breakthrough Protocol 
While working on the virus trials, it was evident that more simulations could be 
done to increase the understanding of how bioaerosols interact with the mask. 




nanometers (nm) as opposed to bacteria which generally is measured in micrometers 
 . These tiny bioparticles are likely to have the ability to escape the mask and 
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was replaced by a High Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) filter. Four runs were done 
exactly how the case trials were conducted. The HEPA filter was placed in a 
centrifuge tube with 50 ml of surrogate viruses buffer and vortexed for 10 minutes. 
The liquid from the tube was then placed in a 50 ml conical tube. The filter flask was 
collected the same way as before. The surrogate viruses also allowed us to test 
breakthrough of the scavenging mask. Once again, everything was set up just as in the 
case trials. The dilutions used in the standard curve was used in the same fashion 
starting from 10-8 dilution to 0 dilution, but only with one run per dilution. The only 
thing that was collected in these runs were the liquid from the impingers since what 
was found outside the mask was all that was of concern.  
2.6 Analyses 
2.6.1 Captured Microorganisms 
For both the bacteria and surrogate virus trials, the spread plate method was used 
to analyze the results. This works by taking the captured sample and diluting the 
sample by factors of 10. In the bacteria trials, media was used that would cause 
selective growth of the bacteria being analyzed. This means that the media offers the 
optimal growth conditions for the said bacteria but is not optimal for the other or any 
contamination that may occur. As mentioned before, the surrogate viruses used has 
individual host cells that they attacked to create plaques. Just like the cells, the 
samples were diluted by factors of 10, then plaque assay was performed as mentioned 
in Appendix B. Since 100 µL out of 1 ml of sample was taken to analyze, all data was 
multiplied by 10 and then by however much liquid the bioaerosols was captured in to 




2.6.2 Statistical Approach 
Initially, descriptive statistics were used (i.e., mean, standard deviation, and 
standard error) in this project instead of more advanced methods because of the 
number of groups that are being compared at once. At any given portion of the study, 
no more than two groups were being compared at the same time.  
A one tailed 2 sample t-test, descriptive statistics, and a regression line were 
generated using Microsoft Excel 2013. The t-test were used to find significant 
differences between two points in three different scenarios: impingers from control 
and case (mask vs no mask), difference between what is captured outside the mask to 
what is captured inside, and difference in what is captured by the filter and what 




CHAPTER 3. RESULTS 
3.1 Surrogate Bacteria Trials 
3.1.1 Standard Curve 
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capture of 2.36E+08 CFUs and 5.76E+07 CFUs (Colony Forming Units) for P. 
aeruginosa and S. aureus respectively. Looking at the figure, it does not appear to be 
within the saturation part of the curve. The limit of detection seems to begin at 
dilution -6 for P. aeruginosa and -5 for S. aureus, which means the indicated linear 
range for this this concentration is 0 to -6 dilution for P. aeruginosa and 0 to -5 for S. 
aureus. This showed the impingers essentially captured the majority of the bacteria 
nebulized in the air. In both cases the concentration of bacteria is higher in the 0 
dilution than what was calculated being nebulized into the air. Looking at the overall 
trend of the standard curve, it decreased in CFUs as expected by a one log reduction 
with each dilution. For P. aeruginosa, the second and third dilution was not a one log 
reduction, but in the fourth dilution was reduced by 2 log. The raw data can be found 








 Even though most of the data for the case runs show the scavenging mask 
working, there is a great amount of bacteria that is unaccounted for. The amount that 
is nebulized out of the mouth for P. aeruginosa and S. aureus is about 1.14E+08 
CFUs and 2.05E+07 CFUs respectively. Adding the average amount captured by the 
impinger, filter, and filter flask gives the amount of bacteria that is accounted for 
which equals to about 2.76E+05 CFUs for P. aeruginosa and 9.83E+06 CFUs for S. 
aureus. This means that over 99% of P. aeruginosa and 51% of the S. aureus are 
unaccounted for. Theses three points that are summed to get the overall amount of 
bioaerosols do not represent the vast majority of surface area of the mask that can 
cause the bioaerosols to impact or settle that would make it unaccounted. 
3.1.4 Mask vs No Mask 
With knowing how much bioaerosols was captured in the air without using the 
mask, and how much was captured with the mask, a comparison of the usefulness of 
the scavenging system can be determined. Figure 3.5 shows the amount of reduction 
in these bacteria when using the scavenging mask. The P. aeruginosa had on average 
3.25E+06 CFUs when the mask was not used and 8.00E+02 when the mask was used. 
This gives a 99.9998% indicated reduction of this bacteria when using the mask (P-
value   0.029). The S. aureus had on average 5.73E+06 CFUs when the mask was not 
used and 9.47E+06 CFUs when the mask was used. This gives a 94% indicated 





3.2 Surrogate Virus Trials 
3.2.1 Standard Curve 
As mentioned before, the concentration of each surrogate virus used in the 
nebulizer were diluted to get 107 surrogate virus per ml for 50 ml. It was calculated 
that approximately 5.2E+07 surrogate viruses were dispersed from the manikin per 15 
minute run. The average amount captured by the impingers are very close to this 
concentration, indicating that the sampling method is capable of effectively capturing 
almost everything that is being dispersed. The data plotted on Figure 3.6 shows the 
average captured plaque forming units (PFUs) for each dilution in the standard curve. 
The standard curve graph shows that the amount of captured surrogate viruses of 
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saturation point. It also shows the linear range for all surrogate viruses were from the 
     -      -  below the limit of 
   
 
        - 
  -  
 
surrogate viruses that could have been caused by multiple reasons. Besides this 2 log 
reduction, all surrogate viruses decreased by one log up until the limit of detection. 





Table 3.2 Descriptive Statistics of the Initial Plating of the Control Runs 
 
Table 3.3 Descriptive Statistics of the Replating of the Control Runs 
 
If referred to the raw data in Appendix H, it is evident that there is a one log 
increase between the samples 1-6 and 7-12. The raw data for the replated samples can 
be seen in Appendix I. As seen on the two tables the averages were very similar for 
 -121,  -S1, and MS2, while PR-772 varied from each other. Referring to the 
 	
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 surrogate viruses generally presented a 1 log 
reduction in capture efficiency when the impingers were moved six inches from the 
manikin. The means that the distance of 6 inches can cause dispersion of the 
bioaerosols that can cause it to not be captured by the impingers 
3.2.3 Case (Scavenging System Used) 
The descriptive statistics for the impingers, filter, and filter flask of the surrogate 
viruses trials are listed in Tables 3.3 below. During the initial plaque assay plating, 
there were several data points that were reported as 0.00E+00. These data points were 
replated to see if any plaques could be recorded from the sample. The descriptive 
statistics shown are calculated with the second platings findings. All four surrogate 
viruses showed that 99.8% of the surrogate viruses nebulized out of the manikin 
remain unaccounted when the averages for each point is summed. As with the 
bacteria, this can be explained because of the vast amount of surface area of the mask 
  	  The initial set of raw data can be seen in Appendix J and the 
replated data can be seen in Appendix K.  
  PR-772 MS2
n 12 12 12 12
Average 2.23E+06 2.09E+06 1.43E+06 1.30E+06
Stan. Dev 2.72E+06 2.38E+06 1.43E+06 1.16E+06
Stan. Error 7.85E+05 6.88E+05 4.13E+05 3.34E+05
   PR-772 MS2
n 12 12 12 12
Average 2.50E+06 9.93E+05 7.15E+05 1.10E+06
Stan. Dev 3.53E+06 1.49E+06 1.05E+06 1.37E+06









Impinger Filter Filter Flask
Capture By 
Mask
Impinger Filter Filter Flask
Captured By 
Mask
n 12 12 12 N/A n 12 12 12 N/A
Average 3.08E+04 4.10E+04 4.38E+04 8.48E+04 Average 3.18E+04 2.43E+04 2.52E+04 4.95E+04
Stan. Dev 4.42E+04 3.40E+04 4.20E+04 5.26E+04 Stan. Dev 2.84E+04 1.93E+04 2.69E+04 3.32E+04
Stan. Error 1.28E+04 9.80E+03 1.21E+04 1.52E+04 Stan. Error 8.21E+03 5.56E+03 7.76E+03 9.57E+03
Impinger Filter Filter Flask
Capture By 
Mask
Impinger Filter Filter Flask
Capture By 
Mask
n 12 12 12 N/A n 12 12 12 N/A
Average 1.88E+04 1.50E+04 4.67E+04 6.17E+04 Average 1.62E+04 4.08E+04 5.00E+04 9.08E+04
Stan. Dev 1.45E+04 1.16E+04 2.74E+04 3.14E+04 Stan. Dev 2.03E+04 3.09E+04 3.36E+04 4.89E+04
Stan. Error 4.20E+03 3.33E+03 7.91E+03 9.07E+03 Stan. Error 5.87E+03 8.92E+03 9.69E+03 1.41E+04






When comparing what was captured inside the mask to what was captured 
outside the mask, Figure 3.7 shows the details for each surrogate virus.  -121 had an 
average of 3.08E+04 PFUs captured outside the mask and 8.48E+04 PFUs captured 
inside the mask (P-value  0.0064).  -S1had an average of 3.18E+04 captured 
outside the mask and 4.95E+04 captured inside the mask (P-value  0.08). PR-772 
had an average captured outside and inside of 1.88E+04 and 6.17E+04. Finally, MS2 
shows an average of 1.62E+04 and 9.08E+04 PFUs for the amount of surrogate 





 The amount of surrogate viruses      	
       
be analyzed as shown in Figure 3.8. The average amount -121 recovered from the 
filter was 4.1E+04 and 4.4E+04 PFUs broke through the filter barrier (P-value  
0.43). This figure also indicates that an average amount of -S1 captured by the filter 
was 2.4E+04 PFUs and the amount found in the filter flask was 2.5E+04 PFUs (P-
values  0.47). The amount of PR-772 found on the filter was 1.5E+04 PFUs and 
4.7E+04 PFUs (P-value  0.0011) had broken through, and MS2 showed almost 





















When comparing the concentration of surrogate viruses captured using the mask 
as opposed to not using the mask, a significant reduction for all surrogate  viruses 
were found as seen in Figures 3.9.  -121 had an average of 3.08E+04 PFUs captured 
by the impingers when the mask was used and 2.50E+06 PFUs when the mask was 
not in use (P-value  0.018).  -S1 had an average capture of 3.18E+04 PFUs while 
using the mask and 9.93E+05 PFUs when no mask was used (P-value  0.023). PR-
772 indicated an average of 1.88E+04 PFUs while using the mask and 7.15E+05 
PFUs when  	 
 -value  0.022). Lastly, MS2 captured by the impinger 
were 1.62E+04 PFUs for the mask and 1.10E+06 without using the mask (P-value  
0.0096). These large differences in captured bioaerosols and the low P-values indicate 
that there is significant reduction in bioaerosols going into the surround air when 






When looking at the amount of breakthrough seen by the mask per 
concentration, it did not have a 1 log reduction like the concentration in the nebulizer. 
It did generally decrease as the nebulized dilution decreased but not at the same rate. 
MS2 had the highest amount of breakthrough out of all of the surrogate viruses, 
followed by PR-772,  -121, and  -S1. The point that the aerosolized surrogate 
viruses reached the limit of detection with each surrogate viruses were seen as such: 
 -121 = -5,  -S1 = -6, PR-772 = -4, and MS2 = -7. The general trend is that the 
smaller surrogate viruses (with exemption of PR-772) has more breakthrough than the 
larger ones. The raw data can be viewed in Appendix L. 
  
Figure 3.10 Breakthrough of Surrogate Viruses by Concentration 
 The data from the impingers in the case trials for bacteria and surrogate 
viruses were plotted in a scatter plot to see if there is a correlation between size of the 
microorganism and its ability to escape from the mask. Three charts were plotted: 
using all the microorganisms, surrogate viruses only, excluding P. aeruginosa. The 
general trend in all plots is that the larger microorganisms escaped better than the 
smaller ones. When all microorganisms were plotted the data had R2 value of 0.0005. 





3.2.5 HEPA Filters 
Table 3.5 provides the average amount of surrogate viruses that was captured 
from the four runs using HEPA filters in the scavenging mask. Looking at Figure 3.11 
the general trend, with the exception of PR-772, is that more of the smaller surrogate 
viruses passed through the filter compared to the larger viruses that were used. The 
raw data collected can be seen in Appendix M. 
Table 3.5 Descriptive Statistics for the Recovered Surrogate Viruses from the HEPA 
Filters 
 
Filter Filter Flask Filter Filter Flask
n 4 4 n 4 4
Average 2.75E+04 5.00E+03 Average 8.50E+04 1.50E+04
Stan. Dev. 1.50E+04 1.00E+04 Stan. Dev. 3.79E+04 1.73E+04
Stan. Error 4.33E+03 2.89E+03 Stan. Error 1.09E+04 5.00E+03
Filter Filter Flask Filter Filter Flask
n 4 4 n 4 4
Average 6.50E+04 7.50E+03 Average 8.50E+04 3.00E+04
Stan. Dev. 2.52E+04 1.50E+04 Stan. Dev. 2.52E+04 2.45E+04







CHAPTER 4. DISCUSSION 
4.1 Explanation of the Results 
4.1.1 Standard Curve 
A standard curve can generally be separated into three parts: point of 
saturation, linear range, and limit of detection. It is ideal to have the bioaerosols 
concentration in the linear range as to not overload the impingers (saturation) or too 
low of concentration to collect meaningful data. When taking a sample in any 
  	 
 	    
   	






	 anything in the sample, it means that the sample analyzed was below the limit of 
detection. On the other side of the spectrum, saturation can be a big problem. 
Saturation can caused inaccurate results due to the sampler and analyzing methods 
not being able to detect more or less of the substance being analyzed. After 
calculating the amount of surrogate bacteria and viruses in the nebulizer during their 
respective runs and how much can be expected to be released during one run, it was 
found that about 1.14E+08 P. aeruginosa cells, 2.05E+07 S. aureus cells, and 
5.2E+07 for all viruses were nebulized with each 15 minute run. 
In both in the bacteria trials and MS2 in the virus trials had higher 
concentrations of in the 0 dilution than what was calculated being nebulized into the 
air. First, spread plate analysis is a reasonable and proven quantifying method for 
 	   	 
  This is because it takes a small sample of the 
culture and quantifies it. Sampling error can occur taking the sample from a less 
populous area of the culture. Second 






human eye; therefore, it is unknown how well they stay mixed in the nebulizer or if 




When looking at the raw data for P. aeruginosa, there is not much difference 
between the CFU counts for the -2 dilution as is for the -3. This may indicate that P. 
aeruginosa contaminated this dilution after the dilutions were done. The 
contamination would have had to occur afterwards, because the -4 dilution is what is 
expected if each dilution was a one log reduction. Looking at the raw data for all of 




. Since this occurs in all four viruses, it can mostly be 
explained by an error while diluting. This can be caused by not properly mixing 

 -	    
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4.1.2  Control (No Scavenging System Used) 
When compared to the 0 dilution of the standard curve, it is evident that this 
six inch difference in the sampling inlet has shown a roughly two log reduction in P. 
aeruginosa and a one log reduction in S. aureus and all four viruse  
 
see a reduction when the sampling inlet of the impinger is 6 inches away, because as 
the bioaerosols exits from the manikin, it disperses not only upward but also outward 
into the air in many different directions. The reason P. aeruginosa has a two log 
reduction as opposed to a one log reduction can possibly be explained by the fact that 
        S. aureus and may begin to descend before it reaches 
the air sampler due to gravity and air resistance. 
In the virus data, it is evident that there is a one log increase between the samples 
1-6 and 7-12. To ensure the accuracy of this data, the samples were replated to see if 
it would yield any plaques. Even though the trend of the first half being less than the 
second half is still present, the numbers are less uniform and closer to what would be 
expected from the data. This may be explained by the viruses settling in the bottom of 
the nebulizer so fewer viruses are nebulized until later samples when viruses closer to 




4.1.3 Case (Scavenging System Used) 
  	
      	   
 	  
filter and filter flask. This was useful in comparing the CFUs found in the mask to 
what was captured on the outside by the impingers. When comparing what was 
captured outside the mask to what was captured inside, the P. aeruginosa was found 
to have much less captured outside as opposed to S. aureus. P. aeruginosa has been 
known as an issue with hospitals because of its ability of sticking to surfaces because 
of its exopolysaccride secretion. (Evans & Linker, 1973). This exopolysaccride 
secretion means that it is likely to stick to any surfaces that it comes into contact. The 
reason for much higher outside counts of S. aureus maybe 	   
to the mask like the P. aeruginosa. This can also explain why less P. aeruginosa was 
recovered from the filter and filter flask. -S1 had data that was a little out of the 
ordinary compared to the other three surrogate viruses. With a P-value of 0.08, there 
  
 
    	
 	    
impinger and what was collected inside the mask by the filter and filter flask. 
Looking at the raw data of the filter flask for -S1, there were a 4 samples that were 
     
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 "-value. This can be caused by more 
being attached to the filter and could not be removed or that -S1 never reached the 
mask but instead attached itself to the mask. 
 The P-values for P. aeruginosa and S. aureus are at or slightly above 0.5 






   surrogate virus data shows 
even a larger P-value for -121, -S1, and MS2 ranging from 0.25 to 0.47. This 
means that the viruses being nebulized were passing the filter with very little 
resistance from the filter.  
In additional runs, the traditional filter was replaced with a HEPA filter insert. 
     #"$ 
 % A throwaway, extended-media, dry type filter 
with a rigid casing enclosing the full depth of the pleats. The filter shall exhibit a 




diameter.  (Department of Energy, 2005) With the largest virus used being about 200 
nm, it is evident that HEPA filter do help but it will not be fully protective. The graph 
on Figure 3.12 showed the HEPA filters in the scavenging mask followed a general 
trend showing a higher percentage of the smaller viruses passed through the HEPA 
filter compared to the larger viruses. Since the definition of a HEPA filter states that it 
can capture 99.97% of particles at 300nm or larger, it was assumed the HEPA filters 
would capture the bacteria, so only viruses were used. The P-values for the HEPA 
filters were all below 0.05, but would need to have further studies done to derive a 
confident answer. 
The scavenging mask has a large amount of surface area and the suction tube 
is very rigid due to it being corrugated. There are endless possibilities of where the 
rest of the surrogate bacteria and viruses  	 




  could pose an issue of nurses wiping the patients face after 
using the mask. All surrogate viruses and P. aeruginosa had over 99% of the particles 
nebulized unaccounted for and 51% unaccounted for with S. aureus. Even though 
there is a noticeable amount of surrogate bacteria and viruses that are not accounted 
for, it is still being captured by the mask and is reducing the exposure to healthcare 
workers. Since the mask is a one-time use, disposable scavenging system there is no 
cleaning involved and can be discarded after use.  
The scavenging mask is made with soft clear vinyl plastic. (Teleflex, 2014) 
Most vinyl plastics used in medical devices are made with plasticizers such as DEHP 
(di-2-ethylhexyl phthalate) which makes the plastic flexible and versatile. It is also a 
major component in wire and cable insulation making the coating around the wire 
neutrally charged. (European Council for Plasticisers and Intermediates, 2010) 
Generally, both bacteria and viruses have a net negative charge on the surface. 
(Krueger, Ritter, & Smith, 1929) (Dickson & Koohmarie, 1989) Since the mask is 
neutrally charged and the bioaerosols are negatively charged a temporary charge 
polarization can possibly occur. When the negatively charged bioaerosols makes 
contact to the neutral plastic, the electrons in the plastic may realign to be as far away 
from the bioaerosols as possible, leaving the plastic surface near the bioaerosols with 




 When comparing how well the mask reduces bioaerosols exposure to no mask, 
there is a notable difference. There is a 94% reduction or greater in bioaerosols in all 
surrogate bacteria and viruses used in this study. When the concentration of all 
microorganisms captured outside the mask by the impingers is plotted on a scatter 
plot, there is no real trend as the R2 value equals 0.0005. This shows no trend and is 
unable to make predictions using this data. Since the P. aeruginosa has the 
exopolysaccride coating that is believed to cause issues with this study, it was 
removed in a second scatter plot to see if there is a better correlation. Without P. 
aeruginosa the R2 value increased to 0.6153. Then only the viruses were plotted 
where the R2 value increased to 0.8546. The difference between the two values could 
be attributed to the gap in particle sizes between S. aureus     	-121 (~200 
nm).  
 There are very few research papers that have evaluated a way to reduce 
exposure to bioaerosols as done in this study. As part of a larger study, Christopher 
Green (2012) led a team in testing how well N95 respirators work in reducing 









   
where ours only exhaled. Since the flowrate used in this study was based off of tidal 
volume, the amount nebulized in the air should be similar. Their sampling equipment 
was designed for flowrates up to 12.5 lpm as the ones in this project were restriced to 
3 lpm, but as mentioned before, there was little bioaerosols lost from the used 
methods. In their study, the manikin was faced vertically and the sampling system 
was set up one meter away. Even with these differences, the best reduction using a 
N95 respirator was approximately 75% using bacteria, and the worst reduction in this 
research, using the smallest surrogate virus (MS2), was 93.2 %. Even though this is 
only a comparison of a single study, it shows that the scavenging system is much 
more effective in pathogen control than a N95 respirator. 
4.2 Challenges and Recommendations 
Future researchers who replicate this study may want to make some changes 




exopolysaccride characteristics cause unforeseen challenges with this study. The P. 
aeruginosa should be replaced by another bacteria that is similar in size but does not 
have characteristics that make it stick to surfaces as easy. When all data was plotted 
on a graph to make a regression line, the large size gap between the bacteria and 
surrogate viruses may have caused some misleading results with the R2 values. 
A   	

 	 	    	    
 	, give more 
accurate description on how particle size and breakthrough of the mask are related.  
There are also some recommendations with the procedure as well. All 
captured surrogate bacteria and viruses in the case, control and HEPA filter runs 
should have been plated in triplicate instead of only once to ensure accurate results in 
the data. The extraction of viruses from the HEPA filter was less than optimal. After 
each run, the HEPA filters should have been cut in half and placed in a smaller 
container. It may also be desired to use more buffer while vortexing the filters but it 
should be noted that too much buffer will dilute the sample and give false 
representation of what was captured. The two bacteria used in this study had nearly a 
one log difference in the concentrations even though the OD readings were similar. 
The bacteria should have been tittered to understand what concentration of bacteria 
corresponds to a particular OD reading. Finally, the impingers should have remained 
sampling longer after the sample was taken (possibly 5 minutes) to ensure that all 
bioaerosols in the air was captured. 
4.3 Future Research 
This pilot study opened up many opportunities for future research. First and 
foremost, a study needs to be done to understand where the bioaerosols are going and 
account for as much as possible. This is important in understanding how much 
bioaerosols is truly captured by the mask and how much is not being captured and not 
being detected. An additional part of this future study would be to identify how much 
is landing back on the patients face. If this is being seen, then additional protocols for 
cleaning the patients face may need to be implemented to help keep the surrounding 
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snug fit on the patient but identifying common areas of escape can create adjustments 
   	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smoke or visible tracers to see how the particles flow through the system, Finally, 
more research needs to be done using the HEPA filters as a replacement and 





CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSIONS 
The Center of Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimates that hospital 
associated infections have a direct cost up $33.8 billion dollars per year. These cost 
effect not only patients who have a compromised immunity, but also visitors, 
healthcare workers, insurance companies, and with the new Affordable Care Act, 
taxpayers. Referring to the industrial hygiene hierarchy of controls, healthcare 
facilities generally exercise substitution, administration, and PPE controls, but not as 
much in engineering controls. These engineering controls can be used to reduce the 
spread of infection at the source, which would make their infection control program 
more proactive and less reactive. The    	 
       to 
reduce waste anestethic gases, but has all the components of an essential tool in the 
reduction of pathogen exposure to healthcare workers. This study proves that this 
mask has the potential to reduce the amount of airborne pathogens expelled by the 
patient as high as 99%. Even though the data reports that there is an abundant of 
bioaerosols that were unaccounted for, the scavenging system indicates that it can 
reduce the amount of pathogen exposures to healthcare workers. Since the scavenging 
system is disposable, no matter where it is captured in the mask, the pathogens can be 
safely removed from the area. Even though the scavenging system has proven 
reduction, the it can still be improved upon by redesigning the filter system along 
with other components. This pilot laboratory study showed the scavenging mask as a 
promising tool; however, future research needs to be conducted to further validate its 
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Appendix A List of Microorganisms with Additional Information 
Table A 1 Description of Each Microorganism Used 
 






Bacteria (Gram -) 1.5 - 3µm long
LB with Kanamycin & 
Salicylate
Staphylcoccus aureus Bacteria (Gram +) 1 µm diameter Mannitol Salt Agar
 
Bacteriophage          
Specific to  E. Coli 
200 nm long      
150 nm tail fibers
E. Coli 0121:H19
 
Bacteriophage Specific to 
Psuedomonas Fluorescens





Bacteriophage Specific to 
E. Coli 
63 nm in diameter E. Coli K12
MS2
Bacteriophage Specific to 
E. Coli 
27 nm in diameter E. Coli F' Top 10
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Appendix B Procedure for Plaque Assay 
1. Determine how many dilutions is required to obtain the optimal results. For tittering 
purposes, generally diluting to the negative tenth power is usually acceptable. 
2. For each dilution, fill a 1.5 ml effendorf tube with .9ml of surrogate viruses buffer. 
3. Place 100µL of surrogate viruses into the first tube and vortex. 
4. Transfer 100µL from the first tube and place in the second tube, vortex and repeat 
for the next tube. 
5. Have tubes with 4mls of LB top agar preheated and placed in a hot water bath. 
6. Add 200µL of fresh overnight grown host culture in the top agar. 
7. Add 100µL of bacteriophage in the tube and vortex. 
8. Pour in a LB media plate and tilt the plate to ensure complete coverage of the plate. 
9. Allow the top agar to solidify. 
10. Repeat for each dilution. 
11. Allow cells and bacteriophage to grow over night. 
12. The following days, count the plaques on the plates in the same fashion as one would 





Appendix C Standard Procedure for Growing Bacteriophage 
1. Make 1 liter of liquid LB for each bacteriophage being grown and have it prewarm 
  	 
	  
2. Inoculate each 1 liter flask with 5 ml of overnight cell culture of the host cell that is 
appropriate for the bacteriophage. 
3. Monitor OD600 for the culture until it reaches 0.2  0.3 (about 106 cells/ml) and 
inoculate with bacteriophage for a multiplicity of infection of about 0.1 
bacteriophage per cell (about 108). 
4. Continue to monitor the OD600. The readings should increase with a sharp drop 
back down the OD before inoculation. Add 4 ml of chloroform per liter culture. 
5. Add enough NaCl to make 1M NaCl. For LB that has 10g of NaCl, 48g/L should be 
added to the flask. Mix until completely dissolved. 
6. Centrifuge at 10,000 rpm for 10 minutes to pellet cell debris. Decant the supernatant 
into sterile bottles. 
7. Add 70-80g of polyethylene glycol (M.W. 6000) and dissolve thoroughly. Allow it 
	  	  	  
	 
	  
8. Centrifuge at 10,500 rpm for 15 minutes to pellet surrogate viruses. Decant the 
supernatant. 
9. Resuspend in surrogate viruses buffer. 
10. Titter your bacteriophage using plaque assay. 
 
** This protocol was taken from the standard operating procedures (SOPs) of Dr. 







Appendix D Equation and Calculation for Determining the Volume of Surrogate 
Viruses to get a 107 Concentration 
 -121 
 C1V1 = C2V2 
 (1.3 x 1010 surrogate viruses/ml) x (V1) = (10
7 surrogate viruses/ml) x (50ml) 
 V1 = 0.385 ml 
 -S1 
 C1V1 = C2V2 
 (1.6 x 1010 surrogate viruses/ml) x (V1) = (10
7 surrogate viruses/ml) x (50ml) 
 V1 = 0.313 ml 
PR-772 
 C1V1 = C2V2 
 (3.6 x 1010 surrogate viruses/ml) x (V1) = (10
7 surrogate viruses/ml) x (50ml) 
 V1 = 0.139 ml 
MS2 
 C1V1 = C2V2 
 (1.28 x 1010 surrogate viruses/ml) x (V1) = (10
8 surrogate viruses/ml) x (50ml) 





Appendix E Raw Data for the Standard Curve (Surrogate Bacteria) 
Table E 1 Raw Data for P. aeruginosa and S. aureus in the Standard Curve 
 
  
Dilution Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 Average Sample Adjustment
0 1.60E+06 9.10E+06 1.11E+06 3.94E+06 2.36E+08
-1 2.80E+05 3.81E+04 4.20E+05 2.46E+05 1.48E+07
-2 2.25E+04 2.75E+04 2.96E+04 2.65E+04 1.59E+06
-3 3.25E+04 8.90E+02 3.30E+04 2.21E+04 1.33E+06
-4 2.90E+02 3.36E+02 7.10E+02 4.45E+02 2.67E+04
-5 3.10E+01 3.40E+01 2.80E+01 3.10E+01 1.86E+03
-6 3.00E+00 1.00E+00 9.00E+00 4.33E+00 2.60E+02
-7 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 1.00E+01 3.33E+00 2.00E+02
-8 1.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 3.33E-01 2.00E+01
Dilution Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 Average Sample Adjustment
0 1.01E+06 1.50E+06 3.68E+05 9.59E+05 5.76E+07
-1 1.06E+05 1.60E+03 8.20E+04 6.32E+04 3.79E+06
-2 7.40E+03 1.50E+04 1.35E+04 1.20E+04 7.18E+05
-3 6.30E+02 3.20E+02 9.30E+02 6.27E+02 3.76E+04
-4 3.50E+01 6.80E+01 1.08E+02 7.03E+01 4.22E+03
-5 9.00E+00 1.40E+01 8.00E+00 1.03E+01 6.20E+02
-6 5.00E+00 4.00E+00 7.00E+00 5.33E+00 3.20E+02
-7 3.00E+00 3.00E+00 1.00E+00 2.33E+00 1.40E+02





Appendix F Raw and Adjusted Data for the Control Runs (Surrogate Bacteria) 
Table F 1 Data for the Control Runs of the Bacteria Trials 
 
  
Sample CFU/100ml CFU/Sample Sample CFU/100ml CFU/Sample
1 1.22E+04 3.66E+06 1 3.07E+04 6.14E+06
2 5.00E+04 1.50E+07 2 3.90E+04 7.80E+06
3 1.03E+03 3.09E+05 3 1.95E+04 3.90E+06
4 5.30E+02 1.59E+05 4 2.54E+04 5.08E+06
5 1.48E+02 4.44E+04 5 1.16E+04 2.32E+06
6 2.20E+02 6.60E+04 6 1.21E+04 2.42E+06
7 2.87E+02 8.61E+04 7 1.52E+04 3.04E+06
8 5.20E+02 1.56E+05 8 3.50E+04 7.00E+06
9 1.43E+02 4.29E+04 9 1.24E+04 2.48E+06
10 4.50E+04 1.35E+07 10 7.30E+04 1.46E+07
11 7.40E+03 2.22E+06 11 5.70E+04 1.14E+07
12 1.27E+04 3.81E+06 12 1.27E+04 2.54E+06
Average 1.08E+04 3.25E+06 Average 2.86E+04 5.73E+06
Stan. Dev. 1.78E+04 5.34E+06 Stan. Dev. 1.97E+04 3.95E+06
Stan Error 5.13E+03 1.54E+06 Stan. Error 5.69E+03 1.14E+06
P. aeruginosa S. Aureus
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Appendix G Raw and Adjusted Data for the Case Runs (Bacteria) 
Table G 1 Raw and Adjusted Data for the Case Runs of P. aeruginosa 
 
 
Sample Impinger Filter Filter Flask Capture by Mask
1 2.00E+00 1.70E+02 1.52E+02 3.22E+02
2 0.00E+00 3.80E+02 8.10E+01 4.61E+02
3 3.00E+00 1.70E+01 8.00E+01 9.70E+01
4 2.00E+00 5.60E+01 3.70E+01 9.30E+01
5 1.00E+00 6.40E+02 6.30E+01 7.03E+02
6 3.00E+00 3.50E+03 1.57E+02 3.66E+03
7 1.00E+00 2.80E+02 6.30E+01 3.43E+02
8 0.00E+00 4.70E+03 3.80E+02 5.08E+03
9 1.00E+00 1.30E+02 9.30E+01 2.23E+02
10 1.40E+01 2.70E+03 3.10E+01 2.73E+03
11 2.00E+00 4.70E+01 1.00E+01 5.70E+01
12 3.00E+00 5.20E+02 1.90E+02 7.10E+02
Average 2.67E+00 1.10E+03 1.11E+02 1.21E+03
Stan Dev 3.73E+00 1.60E+03 1.01E+02 1.67E+03
Stan Error 1.08E+00 4.62E+02 2.90E+01 4.82E+02
Sample Impinger Filter Filter Flask Capture by Mask
1 6.00E+02 3.40E+04 7.60E+04 1.10E+05
2 0.00E+00 7.60E+04 4.05E+04 1.17E+05
3 9.00E+02 3.40E+03 4.00E+04 4.34E+04
4 6.00E+02 1.12E+04 1.85E+04 2.97E+04
5 3.00E+02 1.28E+05 3.15E+04 1.60E+05
6 9.00E+02 7.00E+05 7.85E+04 7.79E+05
7 3.00E+02 5.60E+04 3.15E+04 8.75E+04
8 0.00E+00 9.40E+05 1.90E+05 1.13E+06
9 3.00E+02 2.60E+04 4.65E+04 7.25E+04
10 4.20E+03 5.40E+05 1.55E+04 5.56E+05
11 6.00E+02 9.40E+03 5.00E+03 1.44E+04
12 9.00E+02 1.04E+05 9.50E+04 1.99E+05
Average 8.00E+02 2.19E+05 5.57E+04 2.75E+05
Stan Dev 1.12E+03 3.20E+05 5.03E+04 3.56E+05





Table G 2 Raw and Adjusted Data for the Case Runs of S. aureus 
 
Sample Impinger Filter Filter Flask Capture By Mask
1 1.66E+03 3.10E+03 1.24E+02 3.22E+03
2 1.66E+03 4.90E+03 1.16E+04 1.65E+04
3 3.50E+02 7.30E+03 3.20E+01 7.33E+03
4 2.93E+02 4.50E+02 1.40E+01 4.64E+02
5 4.40E+01 4.90E+03 4.50E+01 4.95E+03
6 3.60E+02 8.10E+03 4.00E+02 8.50E+03
7 0.00E+00 5.80E+03 1.12E+03 6.92E+03
8 9.70E+01 7.60E+03 7.10E+01 7.67E+03
9 1.30E+02 3.60E+04 1.90E+02 3.62E+04
10 1.92E+03 3.80E+04 7.70E+01 3.81E+04
11 5.60E+03 8.40E+04 4.40E+01 8.40E+04
12 1.87E+03 3.33E+05 3.40E+02 3.33E+05
Average 1.17E+03 4.44E+04 1.17E+03 4.56E+04
Stan. Dev 1.60E+03 9.40E+04 3.30E+03 9.37E+04
Stan Error 4.62E+02 2.71E+04 9.52E+02 2.70E+04
Sample Impinger Filter Filter Flask Capture by Mask
1 4.98E+05 6.20E+05 6.20E+04 6.82E+05
2 4.98E+05 9.80E+05 5.80E+06 6.78E+06
3 1.05E+05 1.46E+06 1.60E+04 1.48E+06
4 8.79E+04 9.00E+04 7.00E+03 9.70E+04
5 1.32E+04 9.80E+05 2.25E+04 1.00E+06
6 1.08E+05 1.62E+06 2.00E+05 1.82E+06
7 0.00E+00 1.16E+06 5.60E+05 1.72E+06
8 2.91E+04 1.52E+06 3.55E+04 1.56E+06
9 3.90E+04 7.20E+06 9.50E+04 7.30E+06
10 5.76E+05 7.60E+06 3.85E+04 7.64E+06
11 1.68E+06 1.68E+07 2.20E+04 1.68E+07
12 5.61E+05 6.66E+07 1.70E+05 6.68E+07
Average 3.50E+05 8.89E+06 5.86E+05 9.47E+06
Stan. Dev 4.80E+05 1.88E+07 1.65E+06 1.87E+07





Appendix H Raw Data for the Standard Curve (Surrogate Viruses) 










-121 Dilution Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 Average Sample adjustment
0 1.10E+05 2.90E+05 4.30E+05 2.77E+05 5.53E+07
-1 2.80E+04 6.00E+03 2.00E+03 1.20E+04 2.40E+06
-2 4.70E+01 7.10E+03 4.70E+03 3.95E+03 7.90E+05
-3 3.40E+01 2.80E+01 4.10E+01 3.43E+01 6.87E+03
-4 8.00E+00 7.00E+00 9.00E+00 8.00E+00 1.60E+03
-5 4.00E+00 5.00E+00 2.00E+00 3.67E+00 7.33E+02
-6 2.00E+00 3.00E+00 3.00E+00 2.67E+00 5.33E+02
-7 0.00E+00 2.00E+00 0.00E+00 6.67E-01 1.33E+02
-8 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 2.00E+00 6.67E-01 1.33E+02
-S1 Dilution Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 Average Sample adjustment
0 1.20E+05 2.30E+05 3.00E+05 2.17E+05 4.33E+07
-1 1.00E+04 5.00E+03 4.00E+03 6.33E+03 1.27E+06
-2 5.50E+01 1.60E+03 1.20E+03 9.52E+02 1.90E+05
-3 2.50E+01 1.50E+01 1.80E+01 1.93E+01 3.87E+03
-4 9.00E+00 1.00E+01 1.10E+01 1.00E+01 2.00E+03
-5 5.00E+00 4.00E+00 3.00E+00 4.00E+00 8.00E+02
-6 3.00E+00 3.00E+00 4.00E+00 3.33E+00 6.67E+02
-7 1.00E+00 0.00E+00 1.00E+00 6.67E-01 1.33E+02
-8 2.00E+00 1.00E+00 1.00E+00 1.33E+00 2.67E+02
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Table H 2 Raw Data for the Standard Curve for PR-772 & MS2 
 
  
PR-772 Dilution Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 Average Sample adjustment
0 1.00E+05 3.50E+05 2.10E+05 2.20E+05 4.40E+07
-1 1.00E+04 5.00E+03 4.00E+03 6.33E+03 1.27E+06
-2 5.10E+01 2.30E+03 1.60E+03 1.32E+03 2.63E+05
-3 1.90E+01 1.60E+01 2.00E+01 1.83E+01 3.67E+03
-4 7.00E+00 9.00E+00 8.00E+00 8.00E+00 1.60E+03
-5 5.00E+00 6.00E+00 3.00E+00 4.67E+00 9.33E+02
-6 3.00E+00 5.00E+00 6.00E+00 4.67E+00 9.33E+02
-7 1.00E+00 0.00E+00 2.00E+00 1.00E+00 2.00E+02
-8 0.00E+00 1.00E+00 0.00E+00 3.33E-01 6.67E+01
MS2 Dilution Sample 1 Sample 2 Sample 3 Average Sample adjustment
0 4.00E+04 4.80E+05 4.10E+05 3.10E+05 6.20E+07
-1 3.80E+04 8.00E+03 6.00E+03 1.73E+04 3.47E+06
-2 3.80E+03 1.80E+03 6.00E+03 3.87E+03 7.73E+05
-3 3.00E+01 3.10E+01 3.80E+01 3.30E+01 6.60E+03
-4 1.00E+01 4.00E+00 7.00E+00 7.00E+00 1.40E+03
-5 4.00E+00 5.00E+00 7.00E+00 5.33E+00 1.07E+03
-6 4.00E+00 1.00E+00 0.00E+00 1.67E+00 3.33E+02
-7 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00
-8 2.00E+00 0.00E+00 1.00E+00 1.00E+00 2.00E+02
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Appendix I Raw and Adjusted Data for the Control Runs (Surrogate Viruses) 






Sample PFU/100µL PFU/Sample Sample PFU/100µL PFU/Sample
1 1.00E+03 2.00E+05 1 2.00E+03 4.00E+05
2 9.00E+02 1.80E+05 2 1.40E+03 2.80E+05
3 1.10E+03 2.20E+05 3 1.00E+03 2.00E+05
4 2.80E+03 5.60E+05 4 2.60E+03 5.20E+05
5 7.00E+02 1.40E+05 5 9.00E+02 1.80E+05
6 2.40E+03 4.80E+05 6 2.70E+03 5.40E+05
7 3.90E+04 7.80E+06 7 3.90E+04 7.80E+06
8 1.00E+04 2.00E+06 8 1.00E+04 2.00E+06
9 3.40E+04 6.80E+06 9 2.60E+04 5.20E+06
10 1.30E+04 2.60E+06 10 1.70E+04 3.40E+06
11 2.30E+04 4.60E+06 11 1.30E+04 2.60E+06
12 6.00E+03 1.20E+06 12 1.00E+04 2.00E+06
Average 1.12E+04 2.23E+06 Average 1.05E+04 2.09E+06
Stan. Dev 1.36E+04 2.72E+06 Stan. Dev 1.19E+04 2.38E+06
Stan. Error 3.93E+03 7.85E+05 Stan. Error 3.44E+03 6.88E+05
Sample PFU/100µL PFU/Sample Sample PFU/100µL PFU/Sample
1 2.30E+03 4.60E+05 1 2.70E+03 5.40E+05
2 1.10E+03 2.20E+05 2 2.50E+03 5.00E+05
3 1.60E+03 3.20E+05 3 2.00E+03 4.00E+05
4 2.40E+03 4.80E+05 4 1.70E+03 3.40E+05
5 1.20E+03 2.40E+05 5 1.10E+03 2.20E+05
6 2.90E+03 5.80E+05 6 3.90E+03 7.80E+05
7 2.50E+04 5.00E+06 7 1.60E+04 3.20E+06
8 5.00E+03 1.00E+06 8 6.00E+03 1.20E+06
9 1.00E+04 2.00E+06 9 1.90E+04 3.80E+06
10 1.40E+04 2.80E+06 10 7.00E+03 1.40E+06
11 1.10E+04 2.20E+06 11 1.00E+04 2.00E+06
12 9.00E+03 1.80E+06 12 6.00E+03 1.20E+06
Average 7.13E+03 1.43E+06 Average 6.49E+03 1.30E+06
Stan. Dev 7.16E+03 1.43E+06 Stan. Dev 5.79E+03 1.16E+06





Table I 2 Raw Data after Replating Selected Points 
 
  
Sample PFU/100µL PFU/Sample Sample PFU/100µL PFU/Sample
1 2.00E+02 4.00E+04 1 4.00E+02 8.00E+04
2 4.00E+02 8.00E+04 2 7.00E+02 1.40E+05
3 3.00E+02 6.00E+04 3 2.00E+02 4.00E+04
4 1.00E+02 2.00E+04 4 2.00E+02 4.00E+04
5 5.00E+02 1.00E+05 5 5.00E+02 1.00E+05
6 1.00E+02 2.00E+04 6 3.00E+02 6.00E+04
7 4.90E+04 9.80E+06 7 2.63E+04 5.26E+06
8 8.10E+03 1.62E+06 8 6.10E+03 1.22E+06
9 4.10E+04 8.20E+06 9 7.00E+03 1.40E+06
10 1.49E+04 2.98E+06 10 6.30E+03 1.26E+06
11 3.00E+04 6.00E+06 11 8.70E+03 1.74E+06
12 5.10E+03 1.02E+06 12 2.90E+03 5.80E+05
Average 1.25E+04 2.50E+06 Average 4.97E+03 9.93E+05
Stan. Dev 1.77E+04 3.53E+06 Stan. Dev 7.43E+03 1.49E+06
Stan. Error 5.10E+03 1.02E+06 Stan. Error 2.14E+03 4.29E+05
Sample PFU/100µL PFU/Sample Sample PFU/100µL PFU/Sample
1 1.00E+02 2.00E+04 1 3.00E+02 6.00E+04
2 4.00E+02 8.00E+04 2 6.00E+02 1.20E+05
3 2.00E+02 4.00E+04 3 5.00E+02 1.00E+05
4 5.00E+02 1.00E+05 4 4.00E+02 8.00E+04
5 4.00E+02 8.00E+04 5 3.00E+02 6.00E+04
6 6.00E+02 1.20E+05 6 4.00E+02 8.00E+04
7 9.60E+03 1.92E+06 7 1.40E+04 2.80E+06
8 1.80E+03 3.60E+05 8 1.00E+04 2.00E+06
9 1.70E+04 3.40E+06 9 1.90E+04 3.80E+06
10 2.40E+03 4.80E+05 10 4.30E+03 8.60E+05
11 8.00E+03 1.60E+06 11 1.40E+04 2.80E+06
12 1.90E+03 3.80E+05 12 1.90E+03 3.80E+05
Average 3.58E+03 7.15E+05 Average 5.48E+03 1.10E+06
Stan. Dev 5.27E+03 1.05E+06 Stan. Dev 6.85E+03 1.37E+06





Appendix J Raw and Adjusted Data for the Case Runs (Surrogate Viruses) 





Sample Impinger Filter Filter Flask Capture By Mask
1 2.00E+03 0.00E+00 2.00E+03 2.00E+03
2 0.00E+00 3.00E+03 0.00E+00 3.00E+03
3 1.00E+03 3.00E+03 4.00E+03 7.00E+03
4 1.00E+03 3.00E+03 5.00E+03 8.00E+03
5 0.00E+00 1.00E+03 5.00E+03 6.00E+03
6 1.00E+03 2.00E+03 0.00E+00 2.00E+03
7 0.00E+00 3.00E+03 1.00E+03 4.00E+03
8 7.00E+03 4.00E+03 0.00E+00 4.00E+03
9 5.00E+03 5.00E+03 3.00E+03 8.00E+03
10 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00
11 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 5.00E+03 5.00E+03
12 1.00E+03 0.00E+00 1.00E+03 1.00E+03
Average 1.50E+03 2.00E+03 2.17E+03 4.17E+03
Stan. Dev 2.24E+03 1.76E+03 2.12E+03 2.69E+03
Stan. Error 6.45E+02 5.08E+02 6.13E+02 7.77E+02
Sample Impinger Filter Filter Flask Capture By Mask
1 4.00E+04 0.00E+00 1.00E+05 1.00E+05
2 0.00E+00 6.00E+04 0.00E+00 6.00E+04
3 2.00E+04 6.00E+04 2.00E+05 2.60E+05
4 2.00E+04 6.00E+04 2.50E+05 3.10E+05
5 0.00E+00 2.00E+04 2.50E+05 2.70E+05
6 2.00E+04 4.00E+04 0.00E+00 4.00E+04
7 0.00E+00 6.00E+04 5.00E+04 1.10E+05
8 1.40E+05 8.00E+04 0.00E+00 8.00E+04
9 1.00E+05 1.00E+05 1.50E+05 2.50E+05
10 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00
11 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 2.50E+05 2.50E+05
12 2.00E+04 0.00E+00 5.00E+04 5.00E+04
Average 3.00E+04 4.00E+04 1.08E+05 1.48E+05
Stan. Dev 4.47E+04 3.52E+04 1.06E+05 1.10E+05












Sample Impinger Filter Filter Flask Captured By Mask
1 2.00E+03 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00
2 1.00E+03 0.00E+00 1.00E+03 1.00E+03
3 0.00E+00 3.00E+02 0.00E+00 3.00E+02
4 0.00E+00 2.00E+03 4.00E+03 6.00E+03
5 2.00E+03 3.00E+03 0.00E+00 3.00E+03
6 1.00E+03 1.00E+03 0.00E+00 1.00E+03
7 4.00E+03 1.00E+03 2.00E+03 3.00E+03
8 1.00E+03 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00
9 3.00E+03 1.00E+03 2.00E+03 3.00E+03
10 0.00E+00 1.00E+03 3.00E+03 4.00E+03
11 4.00E+03 0.00E+00 2.00E+03 2.00E+03
12 0.00E+00 3.00E+03 0.00E+00 3.00E+03
Average 1.50E+03 1.03E+03 1.17E+03 2.19E+03
Stan. Dev 1.51E+03 1.11E+03 1.40E+03 1.82E+03
Stan. Error 4.35E+02 3.20E+02 4.05E+02 5.25E+02
Sample Imp Adjust Fil Adjust F.F Adjust Captured By Mask
1 4.00E+04 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00
2 2.00E+04 0.00E+00 2.00E+04 2.00E+04
3 0.00E+00 6.00E+03 0.00E+00 6.00E+03
4 0.00E+00 4.00E+04 8.00E+04 1.20E+05
5 4.00E+04 6.00E+04 0.00E+00 6.00E+04
6 2.00E+04 2.00E+04 0.00E+00 2.00E+04
7 8.00E+04 2.00E+04 4.00E+04 6.00E+04
8 2.00E+04 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00
9 6.00E+04 2.00E+04 4.00E+04 6.00E+04
10 0.00E+00 2.00E+04 6.00E+04 8.00E+04
11 8.00E+04 0.00E+00 4.00E+04 4.00E+04
12 0.00E+00 6.00E+04 0.00E+00 6.00E+04
Average 3.00E+04 2.05E+04 2.33E+04 4.38E+04
Stan. Dev 3.02E+04 2.21E+04 2.81E+04 3.64E+04











Sample Impinger Filter Filter Flask Capture By Mask
1 2.00E+03 0.00E+00 2.00E+03 2.00E+03
2 4.00E+02 0.00E+00 1.00E+03 1.00E+03
3 0.00E+00 1.00E+03 3.00E+03 4.00E+03
4 0.00E+00 2.00E+03 4.00E+03 6.00E+03
5 1.00E+03 1.00E+03 1.00E+03 2.00E+03
6 2.00E+03 1.00E+03 4.00E+03 5.00E+03
7 0.00E+00 1.00E+03 0.00E+00 1.00E+03
8 1.00E+03 0.00E+00 4.00E+03 4.00E+03
9 0.00E+00 1.00E+03 1.00E+03 2.00E+03
10 1.00E+03 0.00E+00 2.00E+03 2.00E+03
11 2.00E+03 1.00E+03 3.00E+03 4.00E+03
12 1.00E+03 0.00E+00 3.00E+03 3.00E+03
Average 8.67E+02 6.67E+02 1.37E+03 3.00E+03
Stan. Dev 8.06E+02 6.51E+02 1.37E+03 1.60E+03
Stan. Error 2.33E+02 1.88E+02 3.96E+02 4.61E+02
Sample Impinger Filter Filter Flask Capture By Mask
1 4.00E+04 0.00E+00 4.00E+04 4.00E+04
2 8.00E+03 0.00E+00 2.00E+04 2.00E+04
3 0.00E+00 2.00E+04 6.00E+04 8.00E+04
4 0.00E+00 4.00E+04 8.00E+04 1.20E+05
5 2.00E+04 2.00E+04 2.00E+04 4.00E+04
6 4.00E+04 2.00E+04 8.00E+04 1.00E+05
7 0.00E+00 2.00E+04 0.00E+00 2.00E+04
8 2.00E+04 0.00E+00 8.00E+04 8.00E+04
9 0.00E+00 2.00E+04 2.00E+04 4.00E+04
10 2.00E+04 0.00E+00 4.00E+04 4.00E+04
11 4.00E+04 2.00E+04 6.00E+04 8.00E+04
12 2.00E+04 0.00E+00 6.00E+04 6.00E+04
Average 1.73E+04 1.33E+04 2.74E+04 6.00E+04
Stan. Dev 1.61E+04 1.30E+04 2.74E+04 3.19E+04





Table J 4 Raw and Adjusted Data for MS2 
 
  
Sample Impinger Filter Filter Flask Capture By Mask
1 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 6.00E+03 6.00E+03
2 2.00E+03 0.00E+00 1.00E+03 1.00E+03
3 1.00E+03 5.00E+03 3.00E+03 8.00E+03
4 0.00E+00 2.00E+03 1.00E+03 3.00E+03
5 0.00E+00 4.00E+03 5.00E+03 9.00E+03
6 2.00E+03 3.00E+03 1.00E+03 4.00E+03
7 0.00E+00 1.00E+03 2.00E+03 3.00E+03
8 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 1.00E+03 1.00E+03
9 3.00E+03 1.00E+03 1.00E+03 2.00E+03
10 0.00E+00 3.00E+03 3.00E+03 6.00E+03
11 1.00E+03 3.00E+03 3.00E+03 6.00E+03
12 0.00E+00 1.00E+03 3.00E+03 4.00E+03
Average 7.50E+02 1.92E+03 2.50E+03 4.42E+03
Stan. Dev 1.06E+03 1.68E+03 1.68E+03 2.61E+03
Stan. Error 3.05E+02 4.84E+02 4.85E+02 7.53E+02
Sample Impinger Filter Filter Flask Capture By Mask
1 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 3.00E+05 3.00E+05
2 4.00E+04 0.00E+00 5.00E+04 5.00E+04
3 2.00E+04 1.00E+05 1.50E+05 2.50E+05
4 0.00E+00 4.00E+04 5.00E+04 9.00E+04
5 0.00E+00 8.00E+04 2.50E+05 3.30E+05
6 4.00E+04 6.00E+04 5.00E+04 1.10E+05
7 0.00E+00 2.00E+04 1.00E+05 1.20E+05
8 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 5.00E+04 5.00E+04
9 6.00E+04 2.00E+04 5.00E+04 7.00E+04
10 0.00E+00 6.00E+04 1.50E+05 2.10E+05
11 2.00E+04 6.00E+04 1.50E+05 2.10E+05
12 0.00E+00 2.00E+04 1.50E+05 1.70E+05
Average 1.50E+04 3.83E+04 1.25E+05 1.63E+05
Stan. Dev 2.11E+04 3.35E+04 8.39E+04 9.67E+04





Appendix K Raw Data After Replating Selected Points in the Case Runs            
(Surrogate Viruses) 





Sample Impinger Filter Filter Flask Capture By Mask
1 2.00E+03 1.00E+02 2.00E+03 2.10E+03
2 0.00E+00 3.00E+03 1.00E+02 3.10E+03
3 1.00E+03 3.00E+03 4.00E+03 7.00E+03
4 1.00E+03 3.00E+03 5.00E+03 8.00E+03
5 1.00E+02 1.00E+03 5.00E+03 6.00E+03
6 1.00E+03 2.00E+03 2.00E+02 2.20E+03
7 0.00E+00 3.00E+03 1.00E+03 4.00E+03
8 7.00E+03 4.00E+03 0.00E+00 4.00E+03
9 5.00E+03 5.00E+03 3.00E+03 8.00E+03
10 0.00E+00 3.00E+02 0.00E+00 3.00E+02
11 4.00E+02 2.00E+02 5.00E+03 5.20E+03
12 1.00E+03 0.00E+00 1.00E+03 1.00E+03
Average 1.54E+03 2.05E+03 2.19E+03 4.24E+03
Stan. Dev 2.21E+03 1.70E+03 2.10E+03 2.63E+03
Stan. Error 6.38E+02 4.90E+02 6.06E+02 7.59E+02
Sample Impinger Filter Filter Flask Capture By Mask
1 4.00E+04 2.00E+03 4.00E+04 4.20E+04
2 0.00E+00 6.00E+04 2.00E+03 6.20E+04
3 2.00E+04 6.00E+04 8.00E+04 1.40E+05
4 2.00E+04 6.00E+04 1.00E+05 1.60E+05
5 2.00E+03 2.00E+04 1.00E+05 1.20E+05
6 2.00E+04 4.00E+04 4.00E+03 4.40E+04
7 0.00E+00 6.00E+04 2.00E+04 8.00E+04
8 1.40E+05 8.00E+04 0.00E+00 8.00E+04
9 1.00E+05 1.00E+05 6.00E+04 1.60E+05
10 0.00E+00 6.00E+03 0.00E+00 6.00E+03
11 8.00E+03 4.00E+03 1.00E+05 1.04E+05
12 2.00E+04 0.00E+00 2.00E+04 2.00E+04
Average 3.08E+04 4.10E+04 4.38E+04 8.48E+04
Stan. Dev 4.42E+04 3.40E+04 4.20E+04 5.26E+04












Sample Impinger Filter Filter Flask Captured By Mask
1 2.00E+03 4.00E+02 9.00E+02 1.30E+03
2 1.00E+03 1.10E+03 1.00E+03 2.10E+03
3 4.00E+02 3.00E+02 0.00E+00 3.00E+02
4 7.00E+02 2.00E+03 4.00E+03 6.00E+03
5 2.00E+03 3.00E+03 2.00E+02 3.20E+03
6 1.00E+03 1.00E+03 0.00E+00 1.00E+03
7 4.00E+03 1.00E+03 2.00E+03 3.00E+03
8 1.00E+03 1.00E+02 0.00E+00 1.00E+02
9 3.00E+03 1.00E+03 2.00E+03 3.00E+03
10 0.00E+00 1.00E+03 3.00E+03 4.00E+03
11 4.00E+03 7.00E+02 2.00E+03 2.70E+03
12 0.00E+00 3.00E+03 0.00E+00 3.00E+03
Average 1.59E+03 1.22E+03 1.26E+03 2.48E+03
Stan. Dev 1.42E+03 9.63E+02 1.34E+03 1.66E+03
Stan. Error 4.11E+02 2.78E+02 3.88E+02 4.78E+02
Sample Imp Adjust Fil Adjust F.F Adjust Captured By Mask
1 4.00E+04 8.00E+03 1.80E+04 2.60E+04
2 2.00E+04 2.20E+04 2.00E+04 4.20E+04
3 8.00E+03 6.00E+03 0.00E+00 6.00E+03
4 1.40E+04 4.00E+04 8.00E+04 1.20E+05
5 4.00E+04 6.00E+04 4.00E+03 6.40E+04
6 2.00E+04 2.00E+04 0.00E+00 2.00E+04
7 8.00E+04 2.00E+04 4.00E+04 6.00E+04
8 2.00E+04 2.00E+03 0.00E+00 2.00E+03
9 6.00E+04 2.00E+04 4.00E+04 6.00E+04
10 0.00E+00 2.00E+04 6.00E+04 8.00E+04
11 8.00E+04 1.40E+04 4.00E+04 5.40E+04
12 0.00E+00 6.00E+04 0.00E+00 6.00E+04
Average 3.18E+04 2.43E+04 2.52E+04 4.95E+04
Stan. Dev 2.84E+04 1.93E+04 2.69E+04 3.32E+04













Sample Impinger Filter Filter Flask Capture By Mask
1 2.00E+03 6.00E+02 2.00E+03 2.60E+03
2 4.00E+02 1.00E+02 1.00E+03 1.10E+03
3 4.00E+02 1.00E+03 3.00E+03 4.00E+03
4 3.00E+02 2.00E+03 4.00E+03 6.00E+03
5 1.00E+03 1.00E+03 1.00E+03 2.00E+03
6 2.00E+03 1.00E+03 4.00E+03 5.00E+03
7 2.00E+02 1.00E+03 0.00E+00 1.00E+03
8 1.00E+03 2.00E+02 4.00E+03 4.20E+03
9 0.00E+00 1.00E+03 1.00E+03 2.00E+03
10 1.00E+03 0.00E+00 2.00E+03 2.00E+03
11 2.00E+03 1.00E+03 3.00E+03 4.00E+03
12 1.00E+03 1.00E+02 3.00E+03 3.10E+03
Average 9.42E+02 7.50E+02 1.37E+03 3.08E+03
Stan. Dev 7.27E+02 5.78E+02 1.37E+03 1.57E+03
Stan. Error 2.10E+02 1.67E+02 3.96E+02 4.53E+02
Sample Impinger Filter Filter Flask Capture By Mask
1 4.00E+04 1.20E+04 4.00E+04 5.20E+04
2 8.00E+03 2.00E+03 2.00E+04 2.20E+04
3 8.00E+03 2.00E+04 6.00E+04 8.00E+04
4 6.00E+03 4.00E+04 8.00E+04 1.20E+05
5 2.00E+04 2.00E+04 2.00E+04 4.00E+04
6 4.00E+04 2.00E+04 8.00E+04 1.00E+05
7 4.00E+03 2.00E+04 0.00E+00 2.00E+04
8 2.00E+04 4.00E+03 8.00E+04 8.40E+04
9 0.00E+00 2.00E+04 2.00E+04 4.00E+04
10 2.00E+04 0.00E+00 4.00E+04 4.00E+04
11 4.00E+04 2.00E+04 6.00E+04 8.00E+04
12 2.00E+04 2.00E+03 6.00E+04 6.20E+04
Average 1.88E+04 1.50E+04 4.67E+04 6.17E+04
Stan. Dev 1.45E+04 1.16E+04 2.74E+04 3.14E+04





Table K 4 Raw and Adjusted Data for MS2 after Replating of Selected Points 
 
  
Sample Impinger Filter Filter Flask Capture By Mask
1 1.00E+02 0.00E+00 6.00E+03 6.00E+03
2 2.00E+03 1.00E+03 1.00E+03 2.00E+03
3 1.00E+03 5.00E+03 3.00E+03 8.00E+03
4 0.00E+00 2.00E+03 1.00E+03 3.00E+03
5 0.00E+00 4.00E+03 5.00E+03 9.00E+03
6 2.00E+03 3.00E+03 1.00E+03 4.00E+03
7 0.00E+00 1.00E+03 2.00E+03 3.00E+03
8 0.00E+00 5.00E+02 1.00E+03 1.50E+03
9 3.00E+03 1.00E+03 1.00E+03 2.00E+03
10 2.00E+02 3.00E+03 3.00E+03 6.00E+03
11 1.00E+03 3.00E+03 3.00E+03 6.00E+03
12 4.00E+02 1.00E+03 3.00E+03 4.00E+03
Average 8.08E+02 2.04E+03 2.50E+03 4.54E+03
Stan. Dev 1.02E+03 1.54E+03 1.68E+03 2.44E+03
Stan. Error 2.93E+02 4.46E+02 4.85E+02 7.06E+02
Sample Impinger Filter Filter Flask Capture By Mask
1 2.00E+03 0.00E+00 1.20E+05 1.20E+05
2 4.00E+04 2.00E+04 2.00E+04 4.00E+04
3 2.00E+04 1.00E+05 6.00E+04 1.60E+05
4 0.00E+00 4.00E+04 2.00E+04 6.00E+04
5 0.00E+00 8.00E+04 1.00E+05 1.80E+05
6 4.00E+04 6.00E+04 2.00E+04 8.00E+04
7 0.00E+00 2.00E+04 4.00E+04 6.00E+04
8 0.00E+00 1.00E+04 2.00E+04 3.00E+04
9 6.00E+04 2.00E+04 2.00E+04 4.00E+04
10 4.00E+03 6.00E+04 6.00E+04 1.20E+05
11 2.00E+04 6.00E+04 6.00E+04 1.20E+05
12 8.00E+03 2.00E+04 6.00E+04 8.00E+04
Average 1.62E+04 4.08E+04 5.00E+04 9.08E+04
Stan. Dev 2.03E+04 3.09E+04 3.36E+04 4.89E+04





Appendix L Breakthrough of Surrogate Viruses from the Mask by Dilution 
Table L 1 Breakthrough Concentration by Dilution 
 
  
Dilution     PR-772 MS2
0 1.00E+05 6.00E+04 1.20E+05 1.40E+05
-1 6.00E+04 6.00E+04 4.00E+04 1.20E+05
-2 4.00E+04 4.00E+04 6.00E+04 8.00E+04
-3 4.00E+04 2.00E+04 6.00E+04 4.00E+04
-4 2.00E+04 2.00E+04 2.00E+04 4.00E+04
-5 2.00E+04 2.00E+04 0.00E+00 2.00E+04
-6 0.00E+00 2.00E+04 0.00E+00 2.00E+04
-7 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 2.00E+04
-8 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 0.00E+00
80 
  
Appendix M Raw and Adjusted Data for the Surrogate Viruses Recovered from the 
HEPA Filters 









Sample Filter Filter Flask Sample Filter Filter Flask
1 2.00E+03 1.00E+03 1 4.00E+03 1.00E+03
2 2.00E+03 0.00E+00 2 3.00E+03 0.00E+00
3 1.00E+03 0.00E+00 3 7.00E+03 0.00E+00
4 5.00E+02 0.00E+00 4 3.00E+03 1.00E+03
Average 1.38E+03 2.50E+02 Average 4.25E+03 5.00E+02
Stan. Dev. 7.50E+02 5.00E+02 Stan. Dev. 1.89E+03 5.77E+02
Stan. Error 2.17E+02 1.44E+02 Stan. Error 5.46E+02 1.67E+02
Sample Filter Filter Flask Sample Filter Filter Flask
1 3.00E+03 1.00E+03 1 4.00E+03 2.00E+03
2 5.00E+03 0.00E+00 2 4.00E+03 1.00E+03
3 3.00E+03 0.00E+00 3 6.00E+03 1.00E+03
4 2.00E+03 0.00E+00 4 3.00E+03 0.00E+00
Average 3.25E+03 2.50E+02 Average 4.25E+03 1.00E+03
Stan. Dev. 1.26E+03 5.00E+02 Stan. Dev. 1.26E+03 8.16E+02





Table M 2 Adjusted Data for the HEPA Filter Runs 
 
  
Sample Filter Filter Flask Sample Filter Filter Flask
1 4.00E+04 2.00E+04 1 8.00E+04 3.00E+04
2 4.00E+04 0.00E+00 2 6.00E+04 0.00E+00
3 2.00E+04 0.00E+00 3 1.40E+05 0.00E+00
4 1.00E+04 0.00E+00 4 6.00E+04 3.00E+04
Average 2.75E+04 5.00E+03 Average 8.50E+04 1.50E+04
Stan. Dev. 1.50E+04 1.00E+04 Stan. Dev. 3.79E+04 1.73E+04
Stan. Error 4.33E+03 2.89E+03 Stan. Error 1.09E+04 5.00E+03
Sample Filter Filter Flask Sample Filter Filter Flask
1 6.00E+04 3.00E+04 1 8.00E+04 6.00E+04
2 1.00E+05 0.00E+00 2 8.00E+04 3.00E+04
3 6.00E+04 0.00E+00 3 1.20E+05 3.00E+04
4 4.00E+04 0.00E+00 4 6.00E+04 0.00E+00
Average 6.50E+04 7.50E+03 Average 8.50E+04 3.00E+04
Stan. Dev. 2.52E+04 1.50E+04 Stan. Dev. 2.52E+04 2.45E+04
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